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Abstract: The received view in Thomas Hobbes scholarship is that the 
individual rights described by Hobbes in his political writings and 
specifically in Leviathan are simple freedoms or liberty rights, that is, 
rights that are not correlated with duties or obligations on the part of 
others. In other words, it is usually argued that there are no claim 
rights for individuals in Hobbes’s political theory. This paper argues, 
against that view, that Hobbes does describe claim rights, that they 
come into being when individuals conform to the second law of 
nature and that they are genuine moral claim rights, that is, rights 
that are the ground of the obligations of others to forebear from 
interfering with their exercise. This argument is defended against 
both Jean Hampton’s and Howard Warrender’s interpretations of 
rights in Hobbes’s theory. The paper concludes that the theory of 
rights underlying Hobbes’s writing is not taken from Natural Law but 
is probably closer to a modern interest theory of rights. 
Keywords:  







The received view of Thomas Hobbes’s political theory defines the individual 
rights described by Hobbes as being, without exception, “liberty 
rights,” that is, rights that are merely freedoms.1 Liberty rights are not 
correlated with any duties or obligations on the part of others nor do 
they provide a ground for such duties or obligations; they therefore fall 
outside the definition of rights that is used in modern political and moral 
 
1 See for example, D. P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1969); G. S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986); J. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). Also, H. Warrender, The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), although Warrender 
does allow for what he calls “entitlements” (i.e., a right as that to which one is morally 
entitled which turns out, according to Warrender, to be better described by the duties it 
implies) these appear only in civil society when the individual “does collect some entitlements 
as against his fellow citizens, for the civil law does impose obligations upon them 
that secure him in some respects” (p. 195). This point is discussed in more detail below. 
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discourse (in other words, they are not claim rights). As a consequence 
of this, what Hobbes has to say on the subject of rights is dismissed as of 
little or no interest to modern rights theory. Hobbes’s theory of rights, if we 
could even call it a theory of rights, has been perceived as having little to 
contribute, either historically, to theories of natural rights (where Locke’s 
political theory is still accepted as the starting point for modern theories of 
natural rights) or to contemporary discussions that seek to build theoretical 
foundations for rights without recourse to discredited theories of natural 
rights and natural law.2 
 
In this paper I will argue, against the received view represented by 
commentators such as David Gauthier, Gregory Kafka, Jean Hampton and 
Howard Warrender, that as well as describing liberty rights Hobbes also 
describes rights for individuals that are correlated with the duties of others, 
rights, in other words, that can be defined as claim rights. 
In using the terms “claim right” and “liberty right” I am following the 
definitions given by Wesley Hohfeld when he distinguished four uses of 
the word “right” in the legal literature.3 
 
1. A claim right is a right that is correlated with the duties of another or 
others. These duties consist in either refraining from actions that would 
impede the rightholder in her exercise of the right or, sometimes, of 
performing actions that will give the rightholder the thing she has a 
right to or help her to have or do the thing she has a right to. So, if A 
has a claim right to X against B, then B has a correlative duty to A to 
refrain from interfering with A’s having or doing X, or sometimes, a 
duty to give X to A or to help A to have or do X. 
 
2. A liberty right is a freedom from a duty to refrain from doing something 
and it is not correlated with any duties on the part of others. Two 
or more people may have liberty rights to the same thing or action and 
will be in unrestricted competition with one another to exercise their 
rights. A liberty right is the opposite of a duty. So, if A has a liberty 
right to X against B, then B has a correlative no-right (i.e., no claim 
right) that A not do X. A has no duty to refrain from doing X; and B 
has no duty to refrain from interfering with A’s doing X. A and B may 
 
2 There has been a sustained attack on theories of natural rights since Bentham’s 
infamous characterization of such theories as “nonsense upon stilts.” J. Bentham, “Anarchical 
Fallacies,” in J. Bowring (ed.), Works of Jeremy Bentham (New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1962), Vol. II, p. 105. Jeremy Waldron has recently commented that the theory 
has now been so discredited by attacks that “no-one now uses the phrase [natural rights] 
except in a disparaging sense” [J. Waldron, “Rights versus Needs,” The Journal of Ethics 
4 (2000), p. 119]. 
3 W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1919). 
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therefore be in competition for X, each has a liberty right to achieve 
X, neither has a duty to refrain from achieving X and each has no right 
that the other not achieve X. 
 
When referring to Hobbes’s theory of rights, I amreferring on the whole 
to the theory that is given in his mature political work, Leviathan, although 
I will occasionally refer to other works. 
 
First, Hobbes’s definitions of a liberty and a right are as follows: 
 
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence 
of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a man’s power to 
do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his 
judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.4 
 
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus and Lex, Right and 
Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do or 
to forbeare; Whereas Law, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law and 
Right, differ as much, as Obligation and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are 
inconsistent.5 
 
These definitions are quite specific and it is helpful to try and stick with 
them rather than to go against the text where it is unequivocal, although 
it should be mentioned that Hobbes had changed his definition of liberty 
from the definition he gave in De Cive6 and there has been some discussion 
of this and other “inconsistencies” in his use of the term liberty by 
scholars.7 For the purposes of this paper, however, I shall stick with the 
first definition in Leviathan as given above. 
 
So, to have liberty is to be (externally) unimpeded in the use of one’s 
power to act. And a right is therefore an unimpeded freedom to do or to not 
do something. A right, then, according to Hobbes, is a species of liberty. 
We can see from the definitions above that any right will be a liberty, so 
 
4 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books, 1968), II, 
Chapter 14, p. 189, my emphasis. 
5 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 189, my emphasis. 
6 T. Hobbes, De Cive (1647) in On the Citizen, ed. and trans. R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 111. “LIBERTY (to define it) 
is simply the absence of obstacles to motion; as water contained in a vessel is not free, 
because the vessel is an obstacle to its flowing away, and it is freed by breaking the vessel 
. . . Obstacles of this kind are external and absolute; in this sense all slaves and subjects 
are free who are not in bonds or in prison. Other obstacles are discretionary; they do not 
prevent motion absolutely but incidentally, i.e. by our own choice, as a man on a ship is 
not prevented from throwing himself into the sea, if he can will to do so.” 
7 See for example, F. C. Hood, “The Changes in Hobbes’s Definition of Liberty,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1967), pp. 150–163; and J. R. Pennock, “Hobbes’s Confusing 
‘Clarity’: The Case of Liberty,” American Political Science Review 54 (1960), pp. 428– 
436. 
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all rights in the theory are unimpeded abilities to act, or to forbear from 
acting, of one kind or another. 
 
UNPROTECTED RIGHTS, THE RIGHT OF NATURE 
 
Hobbes takes as his starting point the right of nature, that is, the right to all 
things that every individual has in the state of nature. Before any form of 
political order, “every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers 
body.”8 This is an aggregate right; a right to every and any action that I 
deem necessary to my preservation. Hobbes describes the state of nature 
in the following way: 
 
[A] condition ofWarre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed 
by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto 
him, in preserving his life against his enemyes;9 
 
In other words, any action that may help me preserve myself is justified in 
the state of nature and each man is at liberty to perform whatever action he 
sees fit. 
 
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man 
hath to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; 
that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own 
Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.10 
 
Rights held under the right of nature, as defined by Hobbes, conform to 
Hohfeld’s definition of liberty rights. Each individual is free to act or not 
act and that freedom imposes no restrictions on others or on the individual 
right holder, in the form of duties or obligations. This is taken by commentators 
to be the exemplar of a Hobbesian right and for some it carries with 
it the assumption that for Hobbes, this kind of right is a good thing to 
have. I would not want to argue with the view that rights held under the 
right of nature exemplify what a right is for Hobbes but I do want to 
question whether holding a right of this kind is, in Hobbes’s view, a good 
thing. 
 
However much the right to all things in the state of nature may seem 
like an advantage to the individual, Hobbes makes the point that this is an 
illusion. First, in the Elements of Law he warns us, 
 
8 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 190. 
9 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 189–190. 
10 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 189. 
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. . . that right of all men to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had right to any 
thing. For there is little use and benefit of the right a man hath, when another as strong, or 
stronger than himself, hath right to the same.11 
 
And in De Cive he says, 
 
But it was of no use to men to have a common right of this kind. For the effect of this right 
is almost the same as if there was no right at all. For although one could say of anything, 
this is mine, still he could not enjoy it because of his neighbour, who claimed the same 
thing to be his by equal right and with equal force.12 
 
And he reiterates the point in Leviathan: “as long as this naturall Right of 
every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, 
(how strong or wise soever he be) of living out the time, which Nature 
ordinarily alloweth men to live.”13 
 
It is clear that Hobbes wishes to say that rights are not always beneficial 
to the right holders. If the right held is what we have been calling a liberty 
right, in the state of nature, then no one has any duty to stand out of the 
way of the right holder, or to uphold the right or to protect the right holder 
in her exercise of the right. And all other people have an equal right to 
everything, so that there is competition between people who are exercising 
their rights to the same things. In such a case, as Hobbes says, “there is 
little use and benefit” of having the right. If there is no protection of the 
exercise of the right, then holding the right leaves the individual as helpless 
as she would be with no right at all. This is an important point. If Hobbes 
is saying that a pure liberty right (that is, a right not correlated with the 
duty of any others), is of little use to the right holder then we are left with 
the conclusion that Hobbes’s own view of the rights of individuals, at least 
while we are in the state of nature, is that they are of little use to the right 
holder. 
 
To summarize the right of nature; it is an aggregate right that covers 
any possible action that someone, living in the state of nature, might see as 
conducive to his preservation. By Hobbes’s own definition it is a liberty 
to do or to forbear that is unlimited. It is therefore an unimpeded and 
complete freedom to act. And yet there is a contradictory element to the 
right of nature that Hobbes points out. Individuals in the state of nature will 
be unable to enjoy an unrestricted exercise of the right of nature because 
others who may be stronger, have an equally unrestricted right to the same 
things and actions. In other words, individuals are in competition with one 
 
11 T. Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic (1640), in J.C.A. Gaskin (ed.), 
Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), I, XIV, 10, p. 80. 
12 Hobbes De Cive, p. 29. 
13 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 190. 
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another when they attempt to exercise their right of nature. Competition 
is unrestricted with no rules that would place an obligation upon anyone 
to refrain from any action. If we take Hampton’s example of the right of 
every individual to the apples on a tree,14 then anyone may make a run 
at the tree and may use any means to try to prevent others from getting 
there first. Suddenly, as I am tripped and pushed back and beaten by those 
faster than me, my right to the apples on the tree looks ineffectual. There 
is also a problem with the definition Hobbes has given us, of a right as an 
unimpeded freedom to do or to forbear, which now seems contradictory if 
the purest case of a right (the right of nature), is actually a freedom to act 
that will be impeded on all sides. The contradiction, however, is only an 
apparent one; there is no real contradiction, because a right that is unprotected 
is a right that is not worth having. If a right is to be effective for the 
right holder it must be protected in some way so that the impediments to its 
exercise are reduced as much as possible. Only if the right is protected does 
Hobbes’s definition of a right as a liberty (that is, a freedom from external 
impediments) to do or to forbear, make sense. I shall argue that, contrary 
to the interpretations of the commentators, Hobbes does provide, in certain 
cases, for the protection of rights. Those rights do fit the definitions he 
gives and they are not mere liberty rights; they are claim rights. 
 
PROTECTED RIGHTS/CLAIM RIGHTS 
 
A claim right is a right that is correlated with the duty of another or others. 
So far, Hobbes has described only liberty rights, that is, rights held in the 
state of nature that are unimpeded freedoms to do or forbear. But he has 
also pointed out their weakness, which is that they are unprotected and 
therefore the right holder is vulnerable to the interference of others who 
are equally free and unrestricted. How might these rights be strengthened? 
Leaving aside for the moment questions of the enforcement of duties; if 
my right to the apples on the tree was correlated with the duty of all others 
to refrain from acts that would interfere with my exercise of my right, then 
my passage to the tree and the apples would be clear and my freedom to 
pick the apples would be unimpeded. (Or at least it would be unimpeded 
by any deliberate act directed at preventing my exercise of my right. It 
is always possible that someone crossing my path for another reason will 
accidentally block my way to the tree or someone climbing it for a better 
view will block my access, or a sudden earthquake will make me fall over; 
but my right to the apples is at least, cleared of the threat of sabotage.) 
 
14 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 51. 
 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘The Journal of Ethics, 6 (1) pp 63 – 86’ 
- 7 - 
 
 
Now we have a right that fits much better with Hobbes’s own definition of 
a right as a liberty (absence of external impediments) to do or to forbear. 
It also seems reasonable to suppose that his use of the phrase “external 
impediments” refers to the impediments caused by other people’s deliberate 
actions. When he points out the inefficacy of the right of nature in 
the Elements of Law and in De Cive and Leviathan (as quoted above), 
it is in terms of the danger of other individuals’ use of their unlimited 
right. He does not mention other kinds of external impediments such as 
the accidental interference of others or natural physical impediments. 
I will show in the next section that Hobbes describes how individuals 
will choose to give up the right to all things (the right of nature) and thereby 
to put themselves under an obligation to refrain from interfering with the 
exercise of some of the rights of others. This process transforms some of 
the liberty rights held under the right of nature into claim rights, rights that 
are correlated with the duties of others not to interfere with the exercise of 
those rights. It should by now be clear that the result of this transformation 
will be that some of the liberty rights described above as being unprotected 
rights will become protected rights. 
 
THE SECOND LAW OF NATURE, THE INTRODUCTION OF CLAIM RIGHTS 
 
Hobbes describes the way out of the state of constant and unending civil 
war, that is the state of nature, as being provided by a set of rational 
precepts or rules that set out what is necessary in order for individuals to 
best preserve their lives. These “convenient Articles of Peace, upon which 
men may be drawn to agreement”15 are the laws of nature, the second 
of which explains how the right of nature, having failed to provide for the 
security of individuals, must be exchanged for a system of reciprocal transferring 
and renouncing of rights. Hobbes states the second law of nature as 
the law: 
 
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of 
himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented 
with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe. For 
as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in 
the condition of Warre.16 
 
The right of nature is so destructive of security that it must be given up, 
or at least some of the rights held must be given up and Hobbes defines 
 
15 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 188. 
16 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 190. 
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what it is to lay down a right in the following way. “To lay downe a 
man’s Right to any thing, is to devest himselfe of the Liberty, of hindring 
another of the benefit of his own Right to the same.”17 In other words, if 
I lay down my right to the apples on the tree, then I am no longer free to 
interfere with another person’s exercise of their right to the apples on the 
tree. Once I have laid down the right (assuming whatever conditions are 
necessary for me to be able to do that), I will refrain from interfering with 
the right-holder’s exercise of his right. Hobbes states that this is not to give 
a new right to the person to whom the right is transferred, because in the 
state of nature everyone already has every possible right (the right to all 
things). 
 
For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right 
which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right 
by Nature: but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own originall Right, 
without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which 
redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of 
impediments to the use of his own Right originall.18 
 
So, on Hobbes’s analysis, the laying down of a right does not give the 
right-holder a new right but it does change the right or at least change 
the situation with regard to its exercise. This passage also supports the 
argument that when Hobbes says that liberty is the absence of external 
impediments he seems to be thinking of impediments caused by the 
deliberate actions of others. 
 
There are two ways a right may be “layd aside,” according to 
Hobbes, either by renouncing it or by transferring it to another. “By 
Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof 
redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof 
to some certain person, or persons.”19 What does Hobbes mean by 
“benefit” here? Clearly, he intends to show that it is to the benefit of the 
right holder to whom the right has been transferred or who is left with the 
right another has renounced, to be the recipient of the effects of this new 
lack of liberty (on the part of the original right-holder), which will lessen 
the impediments to the exercise of his right. The man who is in receipt of 
the transferred right is now better able to enjoy his exercise of his right. “He 
that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it, as farre 
as lyeth in his power.”20 It now seems clear that something has changed 
for the right holder. He has received a benefit from the transferrence of 
 
17 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 190. 
18 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 190–191. 
19 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 191. 
20 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 197. 
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the right of another and is now actually better able to enjoy the exercise 
of his right. I am not suggesting that he has a new right, a right he did 
not hold before, but that he has a changed right; some impediments to his 
enjoyment of his original right have been removed. Andrew Cohen makes 
a similar point. “Since people have such complete liberty, they can gain no 
new rights from some supposed transfer of right. Still, one person can give 
another something new. He can remove one obstacle in the other’s way 
when she exercises her native rights.”21 Cohen stresses however, that this 
does not amount to a new right. 
 
Let us suppose Charles wishes to transfer to Jane his liberty right to some coconut. In the 
natural condition, Charles, Jane and everybody else have rights to the coconut. This means 
that Jane can get no new rights from Charles. What she can get from him, however, is his 
agreement to stand out of her way. He can will no longer to hinder her use of the coconut. 
In this way, Charles obligates himself to Jane simply by willing not to impede her in the 
future.22 
 
My interpretation differs from Cohen’s on two points. First, as I will argue 
below, the right that Jane now has, linked to Charles’s “agreement to stand 
out of her way,” is a different kind of right to the bare liberty right she 
had before. Second, according to Hobbes, Charles must do more than will 
not to impede Jane in the future, to transfer the right he must signify the 
transfer (I will discuss this in more detail in the next section). 
 
So what does Hobbes say about the nature of the change in the position 
of the person who has renounced or transferred his right? He clearly 
states that an individual places himself under an obligation when he either 
transfers or renounces a right. 
 
And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he 
said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or 
abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make voyd 
that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY,23 
Anyone who transfers or renounces a right is therefore under an obligation 
and has a duty to refrain from any action that would hinder the recipient in 
his exercise of his right. 
 
Summary of Rights under the Second Law of Nature 
 
There is a duty then, on the part of the person who has transferred or 
renounced their right, that is related to the right of the recipient of the 
 
21 A. I. Cohen, “Retained Liberties and Absolute Hobbesian Authorization,” Hobbes 
Studies XI (1998), p. 34. 
22 Cohen, “Retained Liberties and Absolute Hobbesian Authorization,” p. 35. 
23 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 191. 
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transferred or renounced right. It seems reasonable to say therefore, that 
the duty of the person transferring or renouncing the right is correlated 
with the right of the recipient of the transferred or renounced right. 
There might be an objection that Hobbes does not intend there to be 
any “receipt” of a right on the part of the person to whom the right is 
transferred. The following passage on the second law of nature, however, 
makes his intentions clear. 
 
The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, 
or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth 
so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that 
accepteth it.24 
 
So, the right that is voluntarily and deliberately transferred or renounced is 
also accepted by the person to whom it is transferred or renounced. Hobbes 
makes the same point in De Cive: “The transfer of a right requires the will 
of the recipient as well as of the transferor. If either is missing, the right 
does not pass.”25 How does this fit with Hobbes’s declaration that there is 
no resulting new right for the recipient, who, after all, already has a right to 
all things under the right of nature? He does not receive a new right but he 
receives the right (the “it” in “to him that accepteth it” above, is the right 
which has been transferred), that is, the right giver’s right, which right is 
now linked to the new duty of the previous right holder to refrain from all 
actions that would interfere with the recipient’s exercise of the right. 
 
The recipient now has a right that is correlated with a duty on the part 
of another to refrain from actions that would interfere with his exercise 
of the right. This fits the definition of what we have been referring to as 
a claim right, as defined by Hohfeld. And to objectors who might still 
maintain that Hobbes did not intend to introduce claim rights at all, there 
is a passage in a manuscript, written by Hobbes, probably in the sixteen 
sixties or sixteen seventies, that contains the following passage, “Law and 
Right differ. Law is a command. But right is a Liberty or priviledge from 
a Law to some certaine person though it oblige others.”26 Here Hobbes 
restates the distinction between law and right that he makes in Chapter 14 
of Leviathan with the interesting addition of the phrase “though it oblige 
others” referring to a right being the ground of obligations for others. 
 
24 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 191. 
25 Hobbes, De Cive, p. 35. 
26 T. Hobbes, MSS (Chatsworth) Box 1, (D), no. 5, in Q. Skinner, “Hobbes on 
Sovereignty: An Unknown Discussion,” Political Studies XIII (1965), pp. 213–218, my 
emphasis. 
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ANSWER TO AN OBJECTION – HOBBES’S TALK OF LIBERTY 
EXCLUDES CLAIM RIGHTS 
 
An objection could be raised that would state the following: Hobbes is 
saying simply that an individual is giving up liberty under the second 
law of nature, and therefore he sees liberty as pertaining only to the pure, 
unprotected freedom of the right of nature. Indeed from the way Hobbes 
refers to the giving up of liberty and to the retaining of rights or liberty it 
is easy to think, as most commentators have thought, that what he means 
by a right is purely and simply a liberty or freedom. And therefore, the 
rights he describes in the theory are liberty rights, they are held under the 
right of nature and all but the right to self-defense and self-preservation 
are given up upon entering a commonwealth. In other words, it seems that 
what Hobbes describes as happening under the second law of nature is 
merely the giving up of certain rights or liberties on the understanding 
that others will also give them up, and the result is a loss of liberty that 
is compensated for by a decrease in danger. On this interpretation, the 
result of the second law of nature is only a decrease in rights, rather than 
a decrease in liberty rights and an increase in protected or claim rights, as 
I have argued above. If we accept the standard interpretation of the second 
law of nature, however, how can we explain what happens to the recipient 
of the transferred or renounced right? We would have to say that they have 
not received a right that is correlated with a duty. Yet, as we pointed out 
above, Hobbes says: 
 
And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he 
said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or 
abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make voyd 




Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either in consideration 
of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for 
thereby.28 
 
On reading these passages it is hard to see how it could be denied that: 
1. Hobbes does say that a right is received as the result of a transfer and 
2. that the right which is received is correlated with the duty of the person 
who transferred it, to refrain from interfering with the recipient’s 
exercise of the transferred right. 
 
27 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 191. 
28 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 192. 
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If 1 and 2 are correct, then even if Hobbes does sometimes speak as though 
a right is only a liberty right; he has in fact described what I would now 
define as a claim right. 
 
OBJECTIONS FROM COMMENTATORS 
 
Commentators on Hobbes have argued against the notion that the rights 
resulting from the transfer and renouncing of rights under the second law 
of nature are anything other than liberty rights. I will defend the interpretation 
I have given above, against objections from two examples of such 
arguments, chosen from representatives of the two different and opposing 
“readings” of Hobbes’s moral theory. First, the argument given by Jean 
Hampton29 who reads Hobbes as holding an egoistic subjectivist moral 
theory and second that given by Warrrender30 who famously argues that 




All the subjects’ rights in a commonwealth, says Hampton, “arise out of 
their fundamental ‘right of nature’ to preserve themselves.”31 According 
to Hampton, whenever Hobbes uses the word “right” he is using it in the 
sense of Hohfeld’s concept of a right as a privilege or liberty, and she 
makes the point that a right, used in this sense, “is the opposite of a duty. 
If I have a liberty to use land in a certain way, I may do so or not, as I 
desire; in no way am I morally required to do so.”32 Hampton wants to 
stress that liberty rights are non-moral; she argues that such rights carry no 
“objectivist” moral weight. They imply no duty or obligation either on the 
part of the holder of the right to perform the action she has a right to, or on 
the part of others to respect her right to that action. Liberty rights, in other 
words, are not claim rights. 
 
Hampton links her analysis of Hobbes’s liberty rights to her assessment 
of his moral theory. According to her reading of the theory there is no 
objectivist moral claim attached to his notion of a right because there is no 
objectivist moral theory in his writing. And, the liberty rights that Hobbes 
does describe are precisely those rights appropriate to a subjectivist moral 
theory. 
 
29 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, pp. 27–57. 
30 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, pp. 18–29, 
48–53, 195, 253. 
31 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 52. 
32 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 51. 
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[Hobbes] makes a point of giving no objectivist moral reasons for attributing liberty-rights 
to human beings in the state of nature such that a claim-right would have to be linked 
to the exercise of them, and Hobbes accords a person liberty-rights only because of the 
subjectivist ethical position he espouses.33 
 
Hampton defines Hobbes’s ethical stance as subjectivist because he 
defines “good” as “an object or state of affairs desired by any individual in 
a particular place and time.”34 And the notion of a right used by Hobbes 
fits this definition “because he defines a right or rational action as one that 
is instrumentally valuable to that individual in attaining the object of her 
desire.”35 If an action is a means to the end of the desired object then “it 
not only can be described with the adjectives “right” and “rational” but 
also can be characterized as an action that the individual has a “right” to 
take.”36 
 
So, Hampton grounds Hobbes’s notion of a right in a theory of morality 
that gives no other justification for an action other than as a means to a 
desired end. If the desired end is self-preservation then any action towards 
that end is rational and justified and “done with right.” Fitting in with this 
subjectivism, a liberty right to an action or object exists “when reason 
determines that this object or action is necessary to accomplish his desired 
ends.” Using “right” as a noun now, the word “indicates that the action is 
allowed by prudential rationality.”37 Indeed if Hobbes were to say that x 
had no right to y it “could only mean that the person’s action was not an 
effective means to her desired end.”38 
 
Hampton does pull back a little from this interpretation by saying that 
what she has described is the notion of rights that Hobbes ought to hold “if 
he is a subjectivist” and she then asks the question “[b]ut does he actually 
hold it?”39 Her answer to this question is that while there are passages in 
De Cive and Leviathan which seem to describe exactly this notion of a 
right,40 there are other passages in Leviathan where he seems to introduce 
 
33 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 53. 
34 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 53. 
35 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 53. 
36 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 53. 
37 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 53. 
38 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 54. 
39 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 53. 
40 Hampton refers to the following passages in Hobbes, De Cive, and Chapter 14 of 
Hobbes, Leviathan: “. . . each man is drawn to desire that which is Good for him and to 
avoid what is bad for him, and most of all the greatest of natural evils, which is death; 
. . . It is not therefore absurd, nor reprehensible, nor contrary to right reason, if one makes 
every effort to defend his body and limbs from death and to preserve them. And what is 
not contrary to right reason, all agree is done justly and of right.” 
 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘The Journal of Ethics, 6 (1) pp 63 – 86’ 
- 14 - 
 
 
what could be defined as a “claim right,” i.e., a right linked to an obligation 
on the part of others. This presents a problem of interpretation for 
Hampton because she has already stressed that given his ethical subjectivism 
“Hobbes cannot link the notion of obligation with any objective 
moral claim-rights individuals have.”41 
 
The passage in Leviathan to which Hampton is referring is the 
following description of the second law of nature in Chapter 14 (and 
already quoted above in separate parts), 
 
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by transferring it to another. 
By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. 
By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or 
persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; 
then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is 
granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought and it is his DUTY, not 
to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE and 
INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the right being before renounced, or transferred.42 
 
Hampton admits that in this passage it sounds as though Hobbes is saying 
that once we have renounced our liberty right, we then have a duty to 
others not to try to exercise the right we have renounced, and that this 
duty or obligation is correlated with a claim right that the person(s) who is 
the recipient of the right now holds against us. Noting that this and other 
similar passages in Leviathan have been used by Warrender to support his 
view that Hobbes holds a deontological moral theory, Hampton goes on to 
argue that “there is a subjectivist way to interpret the passage on obligation 
and duty quoted . . . from chapter 14.”43 
 
The textual evidence she uses to support her argument is from Hobbes’s 
discussion of “the fool” in Chapter 15 of Leviathan. When Hobbes gives 
his answer to the fool’s question as to why it would not be rational to break 
our contractual promises, when to do so might be in our interests, he replies 
that it is always in our (long term) interest to keep our promises, because 
if we do not we will be cast out of civil society back into a state of nature. 
We cannot expect the protection of those with whom we covenant if we are 
not to be trusted to keep our side of the agreement. Hampton says, of this 
reply, “his explanation does not invoke any normative obligation that we 
have incurred by promising to transfer our right. Instead he invokes self-interest, 
. . .”44 And she concludes that while Hobbes may have apparently 
defined what it means to be obliged or duty-bound to do something in 
 
41 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 55, my emphasis. 
42 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 191. 
43 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 56. 
44 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 55. 
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Chapter 14 by linking it to a person’s surrender of a right, what he shows 
in Chapter 15 is that the reason one should do one’s duty is because it 
is prudent to do so. In other words there is no obligation or duty to not 
exercise the renounced right unless the non-exercise of that right is prudent 
and rational. Once it ceases to be in one’s best interests to “do one’s duty” 
Hampton says, Hobbes tells us that we can and indeed ought to renege on 
our contracts. 
 
. . . all of chapter 21 of Leviathan is devoted to explaining when it is right (i.e., prudent) 
for subjects in a commonwealth to renege on their contract creating the sovereign. And in 
that chapter he repeats . . . what he had insisted on previously in chapter 14, namely, that 
‘A covenant not to defend myself from force, is always voyd.’ So, for Hobbes, self-interest 
explains not only why we should do what we ought but also when our obligations arising 
from the surrender of right in a contract cease:45 
 
Hampton goes too far when she argues that Hobbes tells us to renege 
on our contracts. After all, it is the third law of nature which, Hobbes says, 
is the “Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE” and which defines injustice as 
“the not Performance of Covenant.”46 And, as she reiterates, it is when a 
contract is void that we are no longer obliged to keep it (and it is void if it 
involves contracting not to defend myself). It is one thing, however, to say 
that I cannot contract not to defend myself, or to put it another way, that a 
contract that did so would be void, it is quite another to say that Hobbes is 
telling us to renege on valid contracts. In Chapter 21, where, according to 
Hampton, Hobbes is explaining when it is right for subjects to renege on 
their contract creating the sovereign, Hobbes himself says that he will say 
“what are the things, which though commanded by the sovereign, he may 
neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do.”47 Having defined injustice 
as the not performing of contracts, it is improbable that he is now saying 
that subjects can sometimes renege on or break (valid) contracts without 
injustice. 
 
Hampton summarizes her argument that Hobbes’s subjectivism rules 
out any possibility that obligations could be inextricably tied to the 
surrender of a right thus, “[s]o, for Hobbes, self-interest explains not only 
why we should do what we ought but also when our obligations arising 
from the surrender of a right in a contract cease.”48 Her argument seems 
to be that there is no real link between rights and obligations because 
self-interest will dictate whether or not an obligation is binding. And an 
obligation that can cease to bind in this way does not, on Hampton’s 
 
45 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 56. 
46 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 202. 
47 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 268. 
48 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 56. 
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view, constitute a genuine moral obligation. But Hampton is wrong to 
suggest that the obligations that come into force after the renouncing and 
transferring of rights are so easily annulled. Hobbes is not saying that self-interest 
will always, as it were, trump an obligation. Indeed his reply to 
the fool makes precisely this point. When self-interest tells us to break an 
agreement we should remember that there is a deeper reason for keeping 
our agreements than for breaking them. The whole project of entering 
civil society and living in peace is dependent upon our ability to keep our 
agreements. And the laws that set out our obligations cannot be ignored 
or annulled whenever it seems to be in our interests to act against them. 
If obligations ceased to bind people every time that self-interest suggested 
breaking a contract, the argument against the fool wouldn’t work. Self-interest 
could always be used to justify breaking a contract. But Hobbes 
insists that the fool is wrong to think that “there is no such thing as Justice” 
and that as “every mans conservation and contentment, being committed 
to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do 
what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make; keep, or 
not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones 
benefit.”49 Hobbes rails against this misinterpretation of what he is trying 
to argue. “This specious reasoning is neverthelesse false . . . Justice, that 
is to say, Keeping of Covenants, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are 
forbidden to do anything destructive of our life; and consequently a Law 
of Nature.”50 The laws of nature are not subject to the whims of individuals’ 
interests, on the contrary “[t]he Lawes of Nature are immutable 
and Eternall; For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception 
of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never 
be that Warre shall preserve life and Peace destroy it.”51 
 
There are of course notorious difficulties with Hobbes’s moral theory, 
not least the fact that it is interpreted by some, like Hampton, as subjectivist 
and egoistic and by others, like Warrender, as deontological. I will not 
enter that debate here, except to say that Hobbes sets out to deduce a moral 
theory from a principle of self-preservation. All I want to argue is that the 
rights Hobbes describes, that result from the transfer and renouncing of 
liberty rights under the second law of nature, are claim rights. That is, that 
they are rights that are the ground of other people’s duties or obligations. 
The person who has transferred or renounced a liberty right becomes obligated 
to the person who receives that right to not interfere with her exercise 
of her right and this obligation is morally binding. 
 
49 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 203. 
50 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 204–205. 
51 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 215. 
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Hampton’s argument is that they are not really claim rights because 
such rights are not possible with the type of (subjectivist) moral theory 
Hobbes has and because the obligations he describes are not really binding 
(“. . . contractual obligations exist only insofar as it is in our interest to 
perform them”).52 My reply has been: while there will always be those who 
disagree with Hobbes’s moral theory and who will argue than he cannot 
succeed in deriving moral concepts from his principle of self-preservation, 
nevertheless, even Hampton admits that it is a genuine attempt to create a 
moral theory and so, I would argue, that Hobbes derives, amongst other 
moral concepts, the concept of moral claim rights. Moreover, the obligations 
that arise from the transfer of liberty rights are indeed morally 
binding in that they arise from conforming to the second law of nature, 
(which is a moral law), it is a requirement of justice that they are honoured 




Hobbes uses the word “right” in two different ways, according to 
Warrender. On the one hand, he uses it to mean “something to which 
one is morally entitled,”53 which he says is equivalent to a description 
of other people’s duties and is the meaning usually given to the word in 
moral and political philosophy. Used in this way a right denotes the duties 
which other people have towards the right holder. He claims that Hobbes 
sometimes uses the word right to mean entitlement (or claim right), but 
this is usually when he is discussing the rights of the sovereign. The only 
other instance in which there are rights that are entitlements are in civil 
society, when the individual “does collect some entitlements as against 
his fellow citizens, for the civil law does impose obligations upon them 
that secure him in some respects.”54 These are rights granted to him by the 
sovereign when he makes the law and are therefore not to be confused with 
those rights which the individual has prior to civil society. When Hobbes 
is discussing the rights of the subjects he uses the word in a different 
way, according to Warrender, to mean freedom from obligation. In this 
sense rights “are the antithesis of duties.”55 This form of a right specifies 
“something that the individual cannot be obliged to renounce.”56 and is 
intended as a definition of the rights described by Hobbes as existing in the 
state of nature. “Thus Hobbes’s ‘right to all things,’ for example, does not 
 
52 Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 56. 
53 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 18. 
54 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 195. 
55 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 19. 
56 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 19. 
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imply that men are entitled to everything, but that they cannot be obliged 
to renounce anything.”57 
 
The word “right” is used by Hobbes with a particular meaning, 
according to Warrender, so that “a right to x” should be translated as “a 
freedom from obligation to renounce “x,” whereby rights do not imply 
corresponding duties in other people.”58 
 
When an individual lays down a right, Warrender argues, he “resigns 
a freedom” but does not “transfer a right in the modern sense of making 
over to others an entitlement to some object or service to which he himself 
was entitled previously.”59 And although the person transferring the right 
becomes thereby impeded in his future actions against the person to whom 
the right is transferred, this affects only him, according to Warrender, all 
other people are still free to interfere with the right holder’s ability to 
exercise his own right. Warrender also claims that the person to whom 
the right is transferred has only the same right that he had before. In other 
words, Warrender is arguing that the kind of transfer of rights described by 
Hobbes in the second law of nature does not create a new kind of right, a 
claim right; it does not in fact change the right in any way. 
 
. . . the individual who resigns or transfers a right, takes upon himself a duty which he did 
not have before, but the rights of other people remain the same, whether the transference 
of the right in question was to them or not. Thus if, for example, the individual transfers 
a right to person “p”, but not to person “q”, he will have a duty not to hinder “p” in some 
respect and no duty to “q” in this respect; but the rights of both “p” and “q” will remain 
the same as before. This assertion appears less paradoxical if Hobbes’s special use of the 
word, right, is emphasized. Thus, to resign a freedom from obligation (a right), does not as 
such increase other people’s freedoms from obligation (rights), although, as Hobbes adds, 
it does affect the convenience of their exercise. Similarly, to transfer a right to a particular 
person, does not increase his freedoms from obligation, but it does increase the facility 
with which he can exercise these freedoms. It is of rights in this sense that the second law 
of nature requires a resignation or a transference.60 
 
For the person “p,” Warrender is arguing, his right remains unchanged, 
even in relation to the individual “x” who has transferred his right to “p.” 
Yet he admits that “x” now has a duty towards ‘p” in that he is obliged not 
to hinder “p” in his (p’s) exercise of his right. So, p’s right in relation to 
x is now correlated with a duty of x’s. And this duty that x has, directly 
affects p’s ability to exercise his right, because it ensures that p’s ability 
to exercise his right will not be interfered with by “x;” p’s right is now 
correlated with a duty of x’s to respect p’s exercise of the right. 
 
57 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 20. 
58 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 50. 
59 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 50. 
60 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 50. 
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Even if one sticks with Warrender’s definition of a right as a freedom 
from obligation, this freedom from obligation is now a protected freedom 
from obligation. In relation to x then, p’s right has changed in that it has lost 
its competitive aspect. If x has transferred his right to the apples on the tree 
to p, then p is no longer in a competitive situation with x in exercising his 
right to the apples, and this competitive aspect is one of the characteristics 
of a liberty right, as I have mentioned above. Warrender does point out 
that, although by transferring a right the individual restricts his own future 
actions against the person to whom the right is given yet “he does not 
impede the action of other men as against that person.”61 And he uses this 
to support his claim that the right holder’s right has not changed even in its 
exercise, because there are many other people who may still interfere with 
his exercise of it. It is important to remember, however, that what is under 
discussion is the second law of nature and according to the second law of 
nature we must all lay down some of our rights and indeed, each one of us 
is only obliged to do so when everyone else agrees to do the same: “if other 
men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason 
for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himself to 
Prey, (which no man is bound to).”62 
 
So, the example Warrender has given of one person x, transferring 
his right to p, does not represent the laying down of rights that Hobbes 
describes under the second law of nature. The second law of nature 
operates as a collective system of the transfer and renouncing of all the 
rights that we would not wish another to hold against us in civil society. All 
rights that allow the invasion of the person of another, or a threat to peace, 
or interference with the means to ones preservation, would presumably 
be given up. Exactly which particular rights must be given up is to some 
extent a matter of speculation, as Hobbes himself does not specify exactly 
which rights would be transferred or renounced under the second law of 
nature. If we keep in mind the wording of the law, however, 
 
[t]hat a man be willing, when others are so too, as farrre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of 
himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented 
with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe,63 
 
then we shall be able to say roughly what sorts of rights would have to be 
given up or transferred (it should be noted that when Hobbes says that we 
should be contented with only so much liberty against other men, he must 
be referring to the liberty to interfere with others that is given up every 
 
61 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 50. 
62 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 190. 
63 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 190, my emphasis. 
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time one transfers or renounces a right. This loss of liberty to interfere, on 
the one hand, is replaced with the increased liberty on the other, to exercise 
the rights that have been transferred to us). 
 
Under the second law of nature therefore, everyone would lay down 
their right, say, to p’s body so that his (p’s) right to his own body would 
then be protected by the fact that everyone else now has a duty not to 
interfere with his right to his body. His right has changed from being a 
simple liberty right, to a freedom or liberty right that is protected by the 
duties of others not to interfere with its exercise. In other words it is now 
closer to the definition of a claim right than a liberty right. 
 
Warrender’s argument can be defeated. His argument is that the right 
held by a subject after another subject has transferred the same right to 
him, is completely unchanged by the transfer. It remains a simple liberty 
right. I have shown above that after receiving the transferred right, the 
recipient now has a protected right, a right that is correlated with a duty 
of the transferer. That person now has a duty not to interfere with the right 
holder’s exercise of his right. The right holder therefore has had something 
added to his original right. It is not, as Warrender argues, completely 
unchanged by this process. 
 
HOBBES’S THEORY OF RIGHTS – WHAT KIND OF THEORY? 
 
If I have been right in arguing that Hobbes introduces claim rights for individuals 
once they conform to the second law of nature, what implications, 
if any, does this have for his theory of rights? First, I will say something 
briefly about the way the theory is analysed currently. Commentators on 
Hobbes’s moral theory over the last sixty years or so fall into one of two 
categories; those who interpret him as holding some form of egoism and 
those who argue that he holds a deontological moral theory. One might 
expect that those holding the latter view would see Hobbes as having a 
strong theory of rights but as I have shown in the discussion of Warrender 
above, this is not the case. I have not read any commentators with the 
one illuminating exception of Leo Strauss64 who argue that Hobbes has 
 
64 L. Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Genesis, trans. E.M. 
Sinclair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, Midway Reprint, 1984). Strauss 
argues that Hobbes was the first to place the rights of the individual at the centre of political 
theory. “According to Hobbes, the basis of morals and politics is not the ‘law of nature,’ 
i.e., natural obligation, but the ‘right of nature.’ The ‘law of nature’ owes all its dignity 
simply to the circumstance that it is the necessary consequence of the ‘right of nature’ ” 
(p. 155). “Hobbes, and no other, is the father of modern political philosophy. For it is he 
who, with a clarity never previously and never subsequently attained, made the ‘right of 
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a strong theory of rights or that the rights he ascribes to individuals 
amount to anything more than liberty rights. As I have demonstrated above, 
however, in the sections on Hampton and Warrender, it requires quite a 
strained reading of the text in order to argue that Hobbes does not introduce 
claim rights under the second law of nature. If we give a more straightforward 
reading of the text as I think I have given above and include the 
holding of claim rights against other individuals, how does this affect how 
we might see Hobbes’s contribution to rights theory? In the remainder 
of this paper I will make a few remarks aimed at starting to answer this 
question. 
 
Claim Rights Held against Other Individuals vensus Claim Rights Held 
against the State 
 
One reason for the tendency of Hobbes commentators to argue that there 
are no claim rights for individuals in the theory is the assumption of some, 
that to have a claim right is to have a claim right against the sovereign 
or the state. Warrender, for example, says “[n]atural rights for the citizen, 
in the traditional sense of substantive rights against sovereign authority, 
cannot on Hobbes’s view be given any philosophical justification, and the 
claim to such rights argues only a complete misconception of the nature of 
sovereignty and law”65 
 
The notion of the “traditional sense of substantive rights” as represented 
in Lockean theories of natural rights, where the individual holds, 
as a consequence of natural law, rights that carry correlative duties 
on the part of the state, is the notion of individual rights that informs 
modern discussion of Hobbes’s political and moral theory. When Hobbes’s 
pronouncements on rights are held up against the Lockean prototype they 
are seen to fall well short of a natural rights theory; indeed the very definition 
of a right given by Hobbes is seen to describe a system of rights that 
are “the antithesis of duties”66 and carry no duties attached to them. The 
Hobbesian liberty right can therefore be characterised, and rightly so, as 
nothing more than a freedom to compete for the thing or action to which 
one has a so called right. This understanding of a Hobbesian right along 
with the assumption mentioned above, that claim rights are rights held 
against the sovereign (who therefore has correlative duties towards the 
 
nature,’ i.e., the justified claims (of the individual) the basis of political philosophy, without 
any inconsistent borrowing from natural or divine law” (p. 156). This strikes me as a great 
insight into Hobbes’s theory; that for Hobbes it is always the individual and his right to 
preserve himself that drives the political theory. 
 
65 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 253. 
66 Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, p. 19. 
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right holder) has been one reason for the dismissal of Hobbes’s theory 
as containing no rights for the individual other than liberty rights.67 If, 
however, we can interpret a claim right as a right that can be held against 
other individuals, then we have, under the second law of nature, claim 
rights in Hobbes’s theory. 
 
Jeremy Waldron describes the Hohfeldian claim right in the following 
way. “Hohfeld’s claim-right is generally regarded as coming closest to 
capturing the concept of individual rights used in political morality. To 
say that P has a natural right to free speech, for example, is usually to 
say (maybe among other things) that people owe a duty to him not to 
interfere with the free expression of his opinions.”68 When individuals gain 
claim rights under the second law of nature they gain them against other 
individuals, not against the sovereign, although the sovereign, is obliged 
to obey the law of nature69 and must make them part of the civil law and 
enforce them.70 The sovereign himself is not party to the process of the 
transfer and renouncing of rights, however, and so does not take on duties 
towards subjects in the same way as individual subjects do to each other. 
The sovereign’s relationship to the subjects in terms of their rights is 
a complicated one and will not be gone into here. For the purposes of 
this paper I have restricted my arguments to those concerning individuals 
and their rights under the second law of nature. It is enough for now to 
say that the sovereign is obliged to enforce the rights that individuals hold 
against each other, and the rights that result when individuals conform to 
the second law of nature can be defined as claim rights. 
 
An Interest Theory? 
 
In arguing against those who say that Hobbes includes no “substantive” 
rights or “natural rights” I do not want to make a case for Hobbes as 
a natural rights theorist. Traditional theories of natural rights are usually 
 
67 See for example, Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, 
p. 253 (as in note 65 above), D. Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), and A. Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” in T. 
Sorell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 235, who says that Hobbes gives “no suggestion that the sovereign’s political 
self-control reflects the subject’s rights. Indeed, Hobbes is at pains to deny it . . . , the 
subject, having given up his rights, cannot now appeal to them. Moreover, the one area in 
which Hobbes breaks entirely with later writers on human rights is his insistence that we 
have no right to have a share in the sovereign authority.” 
68 J. Waldron, “Introduction,” in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p. 8, my emphasis. 
69 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 265. 
70 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 314. 
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attached to theories of natural law and often include theological premises 
and, as I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, they have been discredited 
by systematic attacks over the last two hundred years or so. Hobbes 
does share some of the terminology of natural law theories – he defines 
his laws of nature as given to each individual by reason and as comprising 
morality - but he does not share with natural law/natural rights theories, 
a commitment to essences, statements of “necessary natural fact”71 or the 
inclusion of theological premises.72 Hobbes’s theory differs from theories 
of natural law and natural rights in that the need for individual rights does 
not come from a need for natural justice as dictated by the law of nature 
with or without God as its creator. And in Hobbes’s theory it is not because 
of the dictates of a divine or ideal order that people have rights which must 
then be protected out of obedience to or respect for the natural law. In 
Leviathan there is no clearly stated divine origin of the law of nature, nor 
is there an ideal law of nature based on a notion of perfect justice.73 
Hobbes starts from premises about the nature of humans which show 
how, in a state of nature, we will be led inevitably into a war of each 
against each. If humans are to escape from the state of war and enter a state 
of peace certain conditions must be met and these conditions include the 
protection of certain liberties which Hobbes calls rights. The untrammelled 
freedom of the state of nature needs to be replaced with the protected 
freedoms that exist when individuals agree to give up some of their liberty 
rights and accept obligations towards others. The protected freedoms that 
I have defined as claim rights are required, according to Hobbes, if individuals 
are to have the possibility of living a commodious life. It is clearly 
in the interests of individuals to have these protected liberties. And it is 
because it is in what we might call our vital interests, that Hobbes says 
reason will tell us that we must give up some liberty rights in order that 
those liberties required for peace may be protected by the obligations of 
others rather than violated by the liberties of others. 
 
Interest theories of rights base rights on the interests of the individual 
who is to hold the right. Joseph Raz, as an exponent of the interest theory, 
defines a right in the following way: 
 
71 SeeM.MacDonald, “Natural Rights,” in J.Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 24. 
72 See Y. C. Zarka, “First Philosophy and the Foundations of Knowledge,” in T. Sorell 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 64, who says that Hobbes “excludes knowledge of God’s nature from the scope 
of philosophy.” 
73 For an interpretation that does see Hobbes as a natural law theorist see Norberto 
Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. D. Gobetti (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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Definition: “X has a right” if and only if X can have rights, and, other 
things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a 
sufficient reason for holding some other person to be under a duty. 
Capacity for possessing rights: An individual is capable of having 
rights if and only if either his well-being is of ultimate value or he 
is an “artificial person” (e.g., a corporation).74 
 
I want to suggest, though I am not going to argue for it in any further 
detail here, that Hobbes’s theory of rights could be defined as an interest 
theory. It sets out rights for individuals that are the ground for the duties 
of others towards the right holder and the justification for the individual 
holding such rights is that it is in her vital interest to do so, because the 
protection of certain liberties are necessary for the possibility of peace and 
a commodious life. 
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74 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 166. 
 
